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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Trent Petersen appeals the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction. The 
court initially retained jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601(4); however, through no 
fault of his own, and contrary to the court's order, Mr. Petersen was never transported to 
the custody of the Department of Correction during the initial 180-day period of retained 
jurisdiction. Pursuant to a 2005 amendment to I.C. § 19-2601(4), the district court 
purported to extend its jurisdiction an additional thirty (30) days for the purpose of 
obtaining relevant information for its decision whether to place Mr. Petersen on 
probation. However, the court subsequently interpreted the statute to require that such 
an extension be made within the initial 180 days of retained jurisdiction. Accordingly, 
the court committed Mr. Petersen to the custody of the Department of Correction 
without ever recognizing that it had discretion to place him on probation. This appeal 
represents the first opportunity for an Idaho appellate court to interpret the 2005 
amendment. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
Trent Petersen was charged by information with two counts of Issuing Insufficient 
Funds Checks in Elmore County in violation of I.C. 18-3106(b) and (9. (R., pp.20-21.) 
On June 17, 2008, Mr. Petersen pled guilty to one count as charged; the remaining 
count was dismissed. (R., pp.38-40, 45-48.) On August 19, 2008, the district court 
entered a judgment of conviction against Mr. Petersen with a unified sentence of three 
years, with one year determinate. (R., pp.42-44.) At that time, all parties were aware 
that Mr. Petersen had related charges in Madison, Bonneville, and Jefferson counties. 
(Tr., p.1, Ls. 4-11; p.4, L.16 - p.6, L.25.) The court ordered that Mr. Petersen's 
sentence run concurrently with any sentence imposed in those counties. (Tr., p.29, 
Ls.21-23; p.39, ~s.2-9.)' Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601(4), the court suspended execution 
of the judgment and retained jurisdiction so that Mr. Petersen could participate in the 
"rider" program. (R., pp.49-52.)' At that time, I.C. § 19-2601(4) provided that: 
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty, 
in any district court of the state of Idaho, of or to any crime against the 
laws of the state, except those of treason or murder, the court in its 
discretion, may: 
4. Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first one 
hundred eighty (180) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board 
of correction. The court shall retain jurisdiction over the prisoner for the 
first one hundred eighty (180) days or, if the prisoner is a juvenile, until the 
juvenile reaches twenty-one (21) years of age. The prisoner will remain 
committed to the board of correction if not affirmatively placed on 
probation by the court. In extraordinary circumstances, where the court 
concludes that it is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant information 
within the one hundred eighty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction, or 
where the court concludes that a hearing is required and is unable to 
obtain the defendant's presence for such a hearing within such period, the 
court may decide whether to place the defendant on probation or release 
jurisdiction within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30) days, after 
the one hundred eighty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction has 
' The pending charges in the other counties created issues that would not have existed 
if all charges had arisen in Elmore County. (Tr., p.7, Ls.23-25 ("And that's part of the 
problems why I guess there was so many different sentencing dates in Eastern Idaho."); 
p.41, Ls.19-22 ("We had a pre-trial on April 22nd and that's when I was trying to track 
my client down and I was bounced between Madison County jail, Bonneville County jail, 
the Jefferson [County] jail.").) 
"During the course of the rider, [a sentencing judge] recommends that the defendant 
receive the benefit of cognitive based programs, parenting programs and relationship 
programs and such other programming as is deemed appropriate by rider personnel, 
including financial programming." (Tr., p.39, Ls.20-25.) "Defendants in the 'rider' 
program typically spend their time at a correctional facility in Cottonwood, rather than at 
the main prison near Boise." Stafe v. Taylor, 142 ldaho 30, 31, 121 P.3d 961, 
962 (2005). "During that time, correctional personnel evaluate the defendants and then 
issue a written report and recommendation for the sentencing judge to consider when 
deciding whether to place the defendant on probation." Id. 
expired. Placement on probation shall be under such terms and conditions 
as the court deems necessary and expedient. The court in its discretion 
may sentence a defendant to more than one (1) period of retained 
jurisdiction after a defendant has been placed on probation in a case. In 
no case shall the board of correction or its agent, the department of 
correction, be required to hold a hearing of any kind with respect to a 
recommendation to the court for the grant or denial of probation. Probation 
is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court. Any recommendation 
made by the department to the court regarding the prisoner shall be in the 
nature of an addendum to the presentence report. The board of correction 
and its agency, the department of correction, and their employees shall 
not be held financially responsible for damages, injunctive or declaratory 
relief for any recommendation made to the district court under this section. 
I.C. Ej 19-2601 (4). 
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the district court remanded 
Mr. Petersen "to the custody of the sheriff of [Elmore County] to be delivered to the 
proper agent of the State Board of Correction in execution of this sentence." (Tr., p.40, 
Ls.21-24; R., pp.50-51.)3 In its parting comments, the court stated, "I will wish the 
The district court's judgment provided in relevant part: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant be committed to the 
custody of the Sheriff of Elmore County, Idaho, for delivery FORTHWITH 
and within 7 days, to the custody of the ldaho State Board of Correction at 
the ldaho State Penitentiary or other facility within the State designated by 
the State Board of Correction. 
(R., pp.50-51.) The court's order is consistent with I.C. Ej 20-237, which provides in part: 
When any person is convicted in any court of the state and sentenced to 
imprisonment and committed to the custody of the state board of 
correction . . . the sheriff of the county in which such conviction shall have 
been had shall immediately, upon passing of sentence, notify the director 
that a person is in his custody. . . . As soon as possible upon receipt of 
such notice, the director shall dispatch one or more correctional officers, 
as may be necessary, from the department to the place where the 
convicted person is detained, to secure and convey said convicted person 
to any department of correction facility, or other facility within the state 
designated by the state board of correction. 
defendant the best of luck on the rider and I hope to see him back here in 180 days or 
such lesser time as rider personnel deem to be appropriate with their recommendations 
as to conditions of probation." (Tr., p.40, L.25 - p.41, L.4.) Unfortunately, rather than 
being taken into the custody of the Board of Correction, Mr. Petersen was transferred to 
the custody of various county sheriffs in Eastern Idaho. (R., p.54.) 
On February 25, 2009, the district court found that due to Mr. Petersen not being 
sent to the Board of Correction for his rider, the court would utilize the additional thirty 
(30) days allotted by I.C. $j 19-2601(4). As stated in part by the court: 
[Dlue to the defendant being sent to Bonneville County and not on his 
rider as ordered by the Court and miscalculation of retained jurisdiction 
time, the Court, in its discretion and pursuant to authority conferred upon 
the Court by I.C. 19-2601(4), extends the period of retained jurisdiction for 
thirty (30) days, in order to properly dispose of this matter. 
(R., p.54.) Thereafter, the district court entered an Order to Transport Mr. Petersen for 
a hearing to be held on March 2, 2009. (R., p.56.) 
During the hearing held on March 2, 2009, the district court inquired why the 
failure to transfer Mr. Petersen to the custody of the Board of Correction had not been 
brought to its attention prior to the expiration of the initial 180 days of its retained 
jurisdiction. 
THE COURT: And how long -- why are we just hearing about this now? 
Why hasn't someone been in touch with the Court with regard to the fact 
that he was being held in Eastern Idaho and not released to the rider? 
Was the State ever advised? 
MR. FISHER: No, Your Honor. The State was aware that he went from 
here to Eastern Idaho, but wasn't aware of what his status was. 
- 
I.C. 3 20-237. 
(Tr., p.43, Ls.12 -25 (emphasis added).) The court acknowledged that it too had been 
informed that there would be "some delay" due to Mr. Petersen being transferred to 
Eastern Idaho, but that it had not known the extent of such delay. (Tr., p.50, Ls.21-24.) 
Based on a "very restrictive" reading of the statute, the court was concerned that it may 
already have lost jurisdiction. (Tr., p.51, L.18 - p.52, L.3.) Accordingly, the court 
requested briefing on the jurisdictional issue, stating that if Mr. Petersen presented a 
"legitimate argument in terms of the way this statute is read" then it would sentence him 
on March 16, 2009, the last day of the thirty (30) day extension; otherwise it would 
determine that its jurisdiction had expired by operation of law and commit him to the 
custody of the Department of Correction. (Tr., p.51, L . l l  - p.54, L.9.) 
The state argued that "[tlhe extension of jurisdiction for extraordinary 
circumstances must be made prior to the expiration of the one hundred eighty day 
retained jurisdiction period." (R., p.64.) Consequently, the state concluded that 
because the court did not act within the first 180 days, it had lost jurisdiction by the time 
it acted. (R., p.85.) Mr. Petersen argued that based on the statute's plain language, the 
court retained jurisdiction by finding extraordinary circumstances within the thirty (30) 
days allotted by the statute. (R., p.71.) He also argued that the statute should be 
construed in his favor. (R., p.72.) On March 16, 2009, after the parties presented their 
arguments, the court reluctantly agreed with the state. As stated by the court: 
This is not a ruling that makes me particularly happy. Because I 
believe that what has occurred here through its series of events, certainly 
aren't the fault of Defense Counsel. The defendant gets shipped over to 
Eastern Idaho. There is no communication with the Court with regard to 
his status. There is apparently no communication with Defense Counsel 
with regard to his status. And we find out that nothing has occurred. That 
he has not been sent on his rider. He has been held over in Eastern 
Idaho in jails over there pending disposition of other charges. 
Nobody in the other jurisdiction files anything with this Court saying, 
you know, you have got a problem because if the Court had received 
information to that, I could have brought the thing back to reconsider 
sentencing. I could have continued the matter until a later date to impose 
sentencing until after he had completed his obligations in Eastern Idaho. 
. . . .  
From my standpoint, this Court would love to have the law say that 
yes, that if you receive it any time within 210 days you can act. But I don't 
think that's what the law is unless the Supreme Court wants to rule that 
way. And until they do I think I'm bound by the fact that the jurisdiction 
expired at 180 days. 
(Tr., p.63, Ls.2-21; p.66, Ls.9-15.) 
On March 17, 2009, the district court entered its order relinquishing jurisdiction. 
(R., pp.76-79.) On March 19, 2009, Mr. Petersen filed a timely notice of appeal. 
(R., pp.82-85.) 
Whether the district court retained the jurisdiction, or otherwise retained the authority, to 
place Mr. Petersen on probation within thirty (30) days after the purported expiration of 
the initial 180 days of the statutory period of retained jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Retained The Jurisdiction, Or Otherwise Retained The Authority. To 
Place Mr. Petersen On Probation Within Thirtv (30) Days Affer The Purported Expiration 
Of The Initial 180 Days Of The Statutorv Period Of Retained Jurisdiction 
A. Introduction 
The district court had the authority to place Mr. Petersen on probation after 
expiration of the initial 180 days, but within the additional thirty (30) days, of retained 
jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601(4), for three reasons. First, the court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to any reasonable interpretation of the statute. Second, even if the 
court lacked jurisdiction under the statute, the court retained the inherent authority 
under the ldaho Constitution to suspend Mr. Petersen's sentence within a reasonable 
time after termination of its retained jurisdiction. Third, the court had the authority to 
place Mr. Petersen on probation because the period of retained jurisdiction had not 
begun to mn since he was never taken into the custody of the Department of 
Correction. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises 
free review. Sfate v. Doe, 147 ldaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). The purpose 
of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and "give effect to legislative intent." Id. The 
literal words of the statute are the best guide to determining legislative intent. Id. While 
statutory interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute, legislative history is 
always instructive to determine legislative intent even absent any ambiguity in the 
statute. State v. Stover, 140 ldaho 927, 931-32, 104 P.3d 969, 973-74 (2005). If the 
words of the statute are subject to more than one meaning, it is ambiguous and the 
Court must construe the statute to mean what the legislature intended it to mean. 
Stafe v. Doe, 147 Idaho at 328, 208 P.3d at 732. To determine that intent, this Court 
examines not only the literal words of the statute and its legislative history, but also the 
reasonableness of proposed constructions and the public policy behind the statute. Id. 
C. The District Court Retained The Jurisdiction, Or Otherwise Retained The 
Authoritv. To Place Mr. Petersen On Probation Within Thirty (30) Davs After The 
Purported Expiration Of The Initial 180 Days Of The Statutory Period Of Retained 
Jurisdiction 
1. The District Court Had Jurisdiction Pursuant To The Statute Enabling A 
Court To Retain Jurisdiction For A Reasonable Time, Not Exceedinq 30 
Davs, After Termination Of The Initial 180 Days Of Retained Jurisdiction 
The statute provides in relevant part that "[iln extraordinary circumstances . . . the 
court may decide whether to place the defendant on probation or release jurisdiction 
within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30) days, after the one hundred eighty 
(180) day period of retained jurisdiction has expired." I.C. Cj 19-2601(4). In 
Mr. Petersen's case, the initial 180 days of retained jurisdiction passed on February 14, 
2009, while the additional thirty (30) days ended on March 16, 2009. Therefore, the day 
upon which the district court purported to extend its jurisdiction, i.e., February 25, 2009, 
was outside the initial 180 days but within the additional thirty (30) days 
a. The Literal Words Of The Statute Demonstrate That The District 
Court Retained Jurisdiction To Place Mr. Petersen On Probation 
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal words of a statute because the 
literal words are the best guide to determining legislative intent. State v. Doe, 147 ldaho 
326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). By its plain language, the statute provides in 
relevant part that "the court may decide whether to place the defendant on probation . . . 
within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30) days, after the one hundred eighty 
(180) day period of retained jurisdiction has expired." I.C. § 19-2601(4). In 
Mr. Petersen's case, the district court recognized the existence of extraordinary 
circumstances on February 25, 2009. Additional hearings were held on March 2, 2009, 
and March 16, 2009, both hearings were held within the additional thirty (30) days 
provided by statute. 
There is no indication by the plain words of the statute that the legislature 
intended to require a sentencing court to affirmatively extend its jurisdiction before 
expiration of the initial 180 days of retained jurisdiction. Regardless of when a court 
makes the determination that extraordinary circumstances exist, the end result will be 
the same; the court would have found the existence of extraordinary circumstances and 
either placed the defendant on probation or released jurisdiction within thirty (30) 
following the expiration of the initial 180 days. If the legislature intended to create an 
additional hurdle for sentencing courts before they can obtain the benefit of added 
flexibility, then the legislature would have, and certainly could have, inserted language 
to the effect that "the decision itself whether circumstances warrant an additional thirty 
(30) days must be made before expiration of the 180-day period." There is no such 
language in the statute. To read such a limitation on a sentencing court's authority into 
the statute would frustrate the very purpose of the statute, i.e., to ensure an appropriate 
sentencing disposition. 
b. The Leaislative History Of The Statute Demonstrates That The 
District Court Retained Jurisdiction To Place Mr. Petersen On 
Probation 
Even absent ambiguity in a statute, the Court should review its legislative history 
to identify the legislative intent. State v. Stover, 140 ldaho 927, 931-32, 104 P.3d 969, 
973-74 (2005). In 2005, the legislature amended the statute to provide the following: 
In extraordinary circumstances, where the court concludes that it is unable 
to obtain and evaluate the relevant information within the one hundred 
eighty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction, or where the court 
concludes that a hearing is required and is unable to obtain the 
defendant's presence for such a hearing within such period, the court may 
decide whether to place the defendant on probation or release jurisdiction 
within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30) days, after the one 
hundred eighty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction has expired. 
I.C. § 19-2601(4). The legislature amended the statute pursuant to House Bill No. 204; 
the bill was described as: 
An Act Relating To Court Jurisdiction; Amending Section 19-2601, ldaho 
Code, To Provide That Under Certain Circumstances The Court May 
Decide Whether To Place A Defendant On Probation Or Release 
Jurisdiction Within A Reasonable Time After The One Hundred Eighty Day 
Period Of Retained Jurisdiction Has Expired. 
2005 ldaho Sess. Laws 186. The bill's description mirrors Mr. Petersen's argument, the 
legislative intent was "to provide that under certain circumstances the court may decide 
whether to place a defendant on probation . . . within a reasonable time after the one 
hundred eighty day period of retained jurisdiction has expired." 
An analysis of the amendment's Statement of Purpose further supports 
Mr. Peterson's interpretation of the statute. The Statement of Purpose provides in 
relevant part: 
This bill is intended to resolve the uncertainty that now exists as to when a 
sentencing court can make a decision as to whether to place a defendant 
on probation following a period of retained jurisdiction. 
ldaho Code § 19-2601(4) [currently] provides that a sentencing court can 
retain jurisdiction over a defendant for 180 days, and that at any time 
during that period the court may place the defendant on probation. In 
Sfate v. Diggie, 140 ldaho 238, 91 P.3d 1142 (Ct. App. 2004), the Court of 
Appeals reaffirmed that a sentencing court loses jurisdiction over a 
defendant and may no longer place the defendant on probation when the 
180-day period expires. The Court went on to say, however, "We deem it 
unnecessary to hold in this case that a sentencing court may never make 
a decision to place a defendant on probation within a reasonable time 
after the 180-day period of retained jurisdiction has expired where 
extraordinary circumstances exist that may explain or justify court action 
beyond the statutorily established period." 91 P.3d at 1145. 
This bill would provide that a court that has retained jurisdiction may place 
a defendant on probation after the 180-day period has expired only where 
extraordinary circumstances exist that prevent the court from obtaining 
needed information or securing the defendant's presence for a hearing. 
Even then, the 180-day period could be extended only for 30 days. This 
would resolve the existing uncertainty in the law and provide some leeway 
for sentencing courts in the small number of cases where such 
extraordinary circumstances are present. 
2005 ldaho Sess. Laws 186 (Statement of Purpose). Thus, to determine the legislative 
intent, the Court must appreciate the significance of the Court of Appeals' Opinion in 
State V. Diggie, 140 ldaho 238, 91 P.3d 1142 (Ct. App. 2004). 
In Diggie, a district court had initially retained jurisdiction; however, the 180-day 
period of time expired well before the court placed the defendant on probation. Id. at 
239, 91 P.3d at 1143.~ The court later revoked the defendant's probation and the 
defendant appealed. Id. In reply, the State argued that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to put the defendant on probation in the first place because the period for 
Unlike Mr. Petersen, Mr. Diggie remained in the actual custody of the Department of 
Correction the entire period before being placed on probation. Id. Further, the 
Department of Correction sent a letter to the district court indicating that Diggie was not 
a good candidate for their rider program. Id. at 240-41, 91 P.3d at 1144-45. 
retained jurisdiction had already expired. Id. at 240, 91 P.3d at 1144.~ The Court of 
Appeals agreed with the State. However, in dicta, the court made a further statement 
which led to the legislative response at issue now before the Court. As quoted by the 
legislature in the Statement of Purpose, the Court of Appeals stated: 
We deem it unnecessary to hold in this case that a sentencing court may 
never make a decision to place a defendant on probation within a 
reasonable time after the 180-day period of retained jurisdiction has 
expired where extraordinary circumstances exist that may explain or justify 
court action beyond the statutorily established period. 
Id., at 241, 91 P.3d at 1145. Thus, the Court of Appeals suggested that under 
extraordinary circumstances, a district court could place a defendant on probation even 
beyond the statutorily-established period of retained jurisdiction has expired, so long as 
the court takes such action within a "reasonable time" after the 180-day period of 
retained jurisdiction. Id, 
The legislature believed that the Court of Appeals created, or at least identified, 
"uncertainty in the law." 2005 ldaho Sess. Laws 186 (Statement of ~urpose).' The 
"uncertainty" that arose in the wake of Diggie included the following: 1) what 
circumstances would justify a sentencing court placing a defendant on probation after 
the $80-day period of retained jurisdiction had expired; and 2) if such circumstances 
exist, then what constitutes a "reasonable time" after the expiration of that period. The 
legislature responded by providing that extraordinary circumstances include 
Because jurisdictional issues are fundamental, the court considered the State's 
jurisdictional argument even though it was raised for the first time on appeal. Id. 
As set forth below, Mr. Petersen asserts that the Court of Appeals did not create or 
identify uncertainty in the law, rather the court simply recognized, albeit implicitly, the 
fact that district courts in ldaho are vested with inherent authority to suspend sentences 
even after their jurisdiction has expired. See infra, Argument I.C, sub-issue 2. 
circumstances that render a sentencing court unable to obtain and evaluate relevant 
information within the 180-day period. I.C. § 19-2601(4). The legislature further 
responded by providing parameters of the "reasonable time" referenced in Diggie. 
Specifically, a "reasonable time" is a period of time not to exceed thirty (30) days 
following the expiration of the initial 180-day period. 
Neither the dicta nor the factual and legal questions in Diggie required a 
legislative response mandating a sentencing court to make any findings within the initial 
180 days of its retained jurisdiction. To the contrary, the legislative history 
demonstrates that the legislature's intent was to give sentencing courts greater flexibility 
in fashioning an appropriate sentence by providing an additional period of time, not to 
exceed thirty (30) days, for the assessment of relevant information that could not be 
reviewed within the initial 180 days. 
c. Public Policv And A Reasonable Construction Of The Statute 
Demonstrate That The District Court Retained Jurisdiction To 
Place Mr. Petersen On Probation 
To determine legislative intent, this Court examines not only the literal words of 
the statute and its legislative history, but also the reasonableness of proposed 
constructions and the public policy behind the statute. Stafe v. Doe, 147 Idaho at 328, 
208 P.3d at 732. The very purpose of the amendment, and the statute overall, is to 
provide sentencing courts greater flexibility. By providing sentencing courts an 
additional thirty (30) days to review relevant material that could not otherwise be 
reviewed, or to obtain the presence of a defendant who otherwise could not be present, 
the legislature has increased the likelihood that appropriate offenders will in fact receive 
probation. 
Placing appropriate offenders on probation is a significant state interest. See 
e.g., State v. Anderson, 108 ldaho 454, 457, 700 P.2d 76, 79 (Ct. App. 1985) ("The 
state's primary interest in dealing with most minor offenders is rehabilitation rather than 
punishment."). The principal purpose of the retained jurisdiction statute is to provide a 
period for evaluation of the offender's potential for rehabilitation and suitability for 
probation. Thorgaard v. State, 125 ldaho 901, 904, 876 P.2d 599, 602 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The State's interest in fashioning fair sentences for offenders, including the placement 
of appropriate offenders on probation, rather than in prison, should not be frustrated by 
an overly restrictive construction of the statute. As set forth in The ldaho Judges 
Sentencing Manual (ed. 1985): 
Probation is important to the state and the defendant and is a desirable 
disposition in appropriate cases because; 
(I) It maximizes liberty of the individual while at the same time vindicating 
the authority of the law and effectively protecting the public from further 
violations of law; 
(11) It affirmatively promotes the rehabilitation of the offender by continuing 
normal community contracts; 
(Ill) It avoids the negative and frequently stultifying effects of confinement 
which often severely and unnecessarily complicate the reintegration of the 
offender into the community; 
(IV) It greatly reduces the financial cost to the public treasury of an 
effective correction system; [and] 
(V) It minimizes the impact of the conviction upon innocent dependents of 
the offender. 
State v, Russell, 122 ldaho 488, 504, 835 P.2d 1299, 1315 (1992) (Bistline, J., 
dissenting) (quoting The ldaho Judges Sentencing Manual (ed. 1985), at page 800). 
Not surprisingly, the State's interest in increasing a sentencing court's flexibility to 
place appropriate offenders on probation is reflected in the statute's legislative history. 
See 2005 ldaho Sess. Laws 186 (Statement of Purpose ("This bill would provide that a 
court that has retained jurisdiction may place a defendant on probation after the 180- 
day period has expired only where extraordinary circumstances exist . . . . This would 
resolve the existing uncertainty in the law and provide some leeway for sentencing 
courts in the small number of cases where such extraordinary circumstances are 
present.")); 2000 ldaho Sess. Laws 246 (Fiscal Impact ("The Department anticipates a 
decreased length of stay of district court juveniles with the Department at $50,000 per 
juvenile per year, and fewer juveniles recommitted to the Department with the use of 
more appropriate supervision and services following release from custody.")); 1998 
ldaho Sess. Laws 67 (Statement of Purpose ("This bill, if enacted, will clarify that a court 
may sentence a defendant to more than one period of retained jurisdiction in a case 
thereby giving the judge added flexibility in fashioning an appropriate sentence.")); 1996 
ldaho Sess. Laws 418 (Statement of Purpose ("The purpose of this legislation is to give 
the court greater flexibility in retaining jurisdiction over sentenced juveniles who have 
been waived into adult court on a criminal offense."), Fiscal Note ("The additional 
flexibility granted to the court could arguably result in a reduction of the prison 
population.")); and 1994 ldaho Sess. Laws 33 (Statement of Purpose ("Because of the 
current overcrowding problem, inmates are backed up in county jails and in the 
ReceptionlDiagnostic Unit for a considerable length of time. . . . This bill will allow the 
Department adequate time to evaluate and make recommendations to the court . . . 
without having to go through the process of requesting, in writing, an extension of 60 
days for each and every one of the inmates receiving retained jurisdiction.).) 
The district court's construction of the statute would undermine the historical 
purpose of the statute and the strong public policies behind it. Accordingly, this Court 
should interpret the statue to provide that, where extraordinary circumstances exist, a 
district court properly exercises its jurisdiction in placing a defendant on probation within 
a reasonable period of time, not to exceed thirty (30) days, after expiration of the initial 
180-day period of retained jurisdiction. 
2. The District Court Retained The Inherent Authority Under The ldaho 
Constitution To Place Mr. Petersen On Probation Within A Reasonable 
Time Afler Termination Of The Statutorv Period Of Retained Jurisdiction 
Even if the district court's statutory jurisdiction had expired, Mr. Petersen asserts 
that the court possessed inherent authority to place him on probation pursuant to Article 
11, Section I' and Article V, Section 13* of the ldaho ~onstitution.~ As noted above, the 
Article II, Section 1 provides that "[tjhe powers of the government of this state are 
divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no 
person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging 
to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of 
the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted." 
'Article V, Section 13 provides that "[tlhe legislature shall have no power to deprive the 
judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a 
coordinate department of the government; but the legislature shall provide a proper 
system of appeals, and regulate by law, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in 
the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the 
same may be done without conflict with this Constitution, provided, however, that the 
legislature can provide mandatory minimum sentences for any crimes, and any 
sentence imposed shall be not less than the mandatory minimum sentence so provided. 
Any mandatory minimum sentence so imposed shall not be reduced." 
This sub-issue was necessarily incorporated into the jurisdictional issue raised during 
the underlying criminal proceedings. Alternatively, Mr. Petersen asserts that 
jurisdictional issues such as this one are properly raised for the first time on appeal. See 
e.g., State v. Diggie, 140 ldaho 238, 239, 91 P.3d 1142, 1143 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Court of Appeals in State v. Diggie, 140 ldaho 238, 240, 91 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Ct. App. 
2004), suggested that in some circumstances, even after a district court's statutory 
jurisdiction has expired, a court may place a defendant on probation. Mr. Petersen 
asserts that the Court of Appeals in Diggie was relying, albeit implicitly, on a sentencing 
court's inherent authority. As summarized by the Court of Appeals in a case released 
earlier in the 2004 term: 
It is well-recognized in ldaho law that courts have inherent power to 
reopen cases under certain circumstances, despite a prior termination 
of jurisdiction. These powers are 'governed not by rule or statute but by 
the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as 
to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. 
State v. Grifith, 140 ldaho 616, 618, 97 P.3d 483, 485 (Ct. App. 2004) (citations and 
quotations omitted) (emphasis added). ldaho courts have relied in part on the United 
States Supreme Court's statement of inherent authority in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 
501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991). In Chambers, the Supreme Court held that the legislature 
cannot displace a court's inherent powers. As stated by the Supreme Court: 
It has long been understood that "[clertain implied powers must 
necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their 
institution," powers "which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because 
they are necessary to the exercise of all others." For this reason, "Courts 
of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very 
creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their 
presence, and submission to their lawful mandates." These powers are 
"governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in 
courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and 
expeditious disposition of cases." 
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,42-43 (1991) (citations omitted). 
Significantly, the ldaho Supreme Court has held that district courts have the 
inherent authority to suspend the whole or part of any sentence in proper cases. 
State v. McCoy, 94 ldaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (1971). In McCoy, the Court addressed 
the nature and extent of the power vested in the judiciary and resewed to it, inviolate, by 
Article II, § 1 and Article V, § 13 of the ldaho Constitution. In relevant part, the Court 
stated: 
The constitution provides that the judiciary is a department separate from 
the others and that the '* * * legislature shall have no power to deprive the 
judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it 
as a coordinate department of the government * * *' But, this document 
does not explicitly delineate what those powers shall be. For this reason 
we must go beyond the constitution itself to discover what were the 
powers held peculiarly by the judiciary. In this light, we perceive that the 
authority possessed by the courts to sentence necessarily includes 
the power to suspend the whole or any part of that sentence in 
proper cases and this is more than a bare rule of substantive law subject 
to change by the legislature. Rather, it is in the nature of an inherent 
right of the judicial department and one which the separation of powers 
concept in our system of government places above and beyond the rule of 
mandatory action imposed by legislative fiat. 
State v. McCoy, 94 ldaho at 240, 486 P.2d at 251 (emphasis added). Thus, because 
the legislature cannot divest ldaho district courts of their inherent authority to reopen 
cases and to suspend sentences in appropriate cases, the court had the inherent 
authority to place Mr. Petersen on probation even if its statutory jurisdiction had expired. 
3. The District Court Had The Authoritv To Place Mr. Petersen On Probation 
Because The Statutow Period Of Retained Jurisdiction Had Not Beaun To 
Run Since Mr. Petersen Was Never Taken Into The Actual Custod~ Of 
The Department Of Correction 
Mr. Petersen asserts that the district court never lost its jurisdiction to place him 
on probation because the 180-day period of concurrent jurisdiction is triggered only 
upon the Department of Correction taking actual custody of an offender." As stated in 
the statute: 
'O This sub-issue was necessarily incorporated into the jurisdictional issue raised during 
the underlying criminal proceedings. Alternatively, Mr. Petersen asserts that 
19 
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty . 
. . the court in its discretion, may . . . [sluspend the execution of the 
judgment at any time during the first one hundred eighty (180) days of 
a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction. . . . 
I.C. § 19-2601(4) (emphasis added). In Mr. Petersen's case, he was placed in the 
custody of various county sheriffs for the entirety of the first 180 days following entry of 
his judgment of conviction; conversely stated, he was never in the custody of the 
Department of Correction. ldaho precedent supports this interpretation of the statute. 
In State v. McGonigal, 122 ldaho 939, 842 P.2d 275 (1992), the ldaho Supreme 
Court assessed a defendant's claim that a district court did not have jurisdiction to 
resentence him. In McGonigal, the district court had adjudicated the defendant's guilt at 
trial and disposed of the case by sentencing him to prison. Id. at 940, 842 P.2d at 276 
Later that day, the defendant was brought again before the court on allegations that he 
made threatening statements immediately after imposition of sentence. Id. After 
hearing evidence, the court withdrew its earlier sentence and imposed a more severe 
sentence. Id. The defendant claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction to resentence 
him. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the court had jurisdiction to 
resentence him because the defendant had not yet been placed in the custody of the 
Department of Corrections under the original sentence. Id. The Court stated in relevant 
part: 
In this case, at the conclusion of the sentencing on the morning of 
September 23, 1991, the trial court ordered the sheriff to transport 
McGonigal back to the state correctional institution. The sheriff had not 
transported McGonigal to the state correctional institution, nor had the 
board of correction taken custody of McGonigal, before the trial court 
jurisdictional issues such as this one are properly raised for the first time on appeal. See 
e.g., State V. Diggie, 140 ldaho 238, 239, 91 P.3d 1142, 1143 (Ct. App. 2004). 
resentenced McGonigal. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to 
resentence McGonigal. 
Id. Likewise, in Mr. Petersen's case, the court ordered the sheriff to transport 
Mr. Petersen into the custody of the Board of Correction. However, the sheriff had not 
transported Mr. Petersen to the state correctional institution, nor had the Board of 
Correction taken custody of Mr. Petersen, before the district court ordered the additional 
thirty (30) days of retained jurisdiction. Therefore, on March 16, 2009, the district court 
had jurisdiction to place Mr. Petersen on probation. 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion in State v. Williams, 126 Idaho 39, 43-45, 878 
P.2d 213, 217-19 (Ct. App. 1994), provides additional support for Mr. Petersen's 
interpretation of the statute. In Williams, the Court of Appeals rejected the state's 
argument that a district court lacked authority under I.C. § 19-2601(4) to retain 
jurisdiction upon revocation of the defendant's probation. According to the court, the 
State's argument was premised on a misperception that the authority to retain 
jurisdiction under the statute automatically attaches at the initial imposition of sentence, 
even where the sentence is suspended. Id. at 44, 878 P.2d at 218. The State's 
argument failed "because when an offender is placed on probation with the sentence 
suspended, the sentence is not executed and the defendant is not remanded to the 
custody of the Board." Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court discussed the nature 
and extent of a district court's jurisdiction after sentencing, in the absence of the period 
of retained jurisdiction provided by I.C. § 19-2601(4). In relevant part, the court stated: 
If a court sentences a convicted defendant to a prison term and that 
sentence is executed by transfer of the defendant to the physical custody 
of the Board, the court's jurisdiction over the defendant terminates. . . . 
Absent an appropriate Rule 35 proceeding, any effort by the court to alter 
a sentence after the defendant has been placed in the custody of the 
Board is an impermissible invasion of the authority of the Commission of 
Pardons and Parole. . . . This loss of judicial jurisdiction does not occur, 
however, until the defendant has been placed in the custody of the Board. 
Two decisions of our Supreme Court establish that even after a sentence 
to the Board's custody has been pronounced, the court possesses 
continuing jurisdiction to amend that sentence until the defendant has 
been actually transferred to the Board's custody under the original 
sentence and commitment. State v. McGonigal, 122 ldaho 939, 940, 842 
P.2d 275, 276 (1992); State v. Johnson, 101 ldaho 581, 585, 618 P.2d 
759, 763 (1980). 
Williams, 126 ldaho at 43, 878 P.2d at 217. Thus, because a "sentence is executed by 
transfer of the defendant to the physical custody of the Board," the district court never 
lost its jurisdiction to place Mr. Petersen on probation. Alternatively stated, the 180 
days referenced in I.C. § 19-2601(4) never began to run because Mr. Petersen had not 
actually been remanded to the custody of the Board of Correction. Id. at 44, 878 P.2d at 
218 ("In sum, the 180 days referenced in I.C. § 19-2601(4) does not begin until the 
defendant has actually been remanded to the Board.") Accordingly, the district court 
erred in concluding that it had relinquished jurisdiction by operation of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court erred in failing to consider whether to place Mr. Petersen on 
probation after deciding to retain jurisdiction for that very purpose. The district court's 
interpretation of the statute is not only contrary to its plain language and its legislative 
history; such an interpretation will undermine the state's interest in placing appropriate 
offenders on probation. In addition, the court's decision failed to recognize its inherent 
authority to suspend sentences, regardless of whether the statutory period of jurisdiction 
had expired. Finally, the court failed to recognize that it never lost jurisdiction to place 
Mr. Petersen on probation because the Department of Correction had never taken 
actual custody of Mr. Petersen. 
For all these reasons, Mr. Petersen respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the decision of the district court and remand the case to provide the district court a full 
opportunity to assess whether Mr. Petersen should be placed on probation. 
DATED this 19'~ day of February, 2010. 
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